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INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1960, thousands of people gathered outside a police
station in the town of Sharpeville, South Africa.1 The majority of
individuals in the crowd were protesting the government’s mandate that
all black South Africans carry a “passbook,” a government issued form of
identification.2 According to the police reports, protestors began to throw
stones at officers in an attempt to force their way into the police station.3
The police opened fire on the protestors in response, and when the firing
ceased approximately two minutes later, 69 people were dead.4 Instances
such as the massacre in Sharpeville were not uncommon in apartheid5
South Africa.6
In 2002, a number of apartheid victims brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging both
direct and secondary tort liability for violations of international law.7
Interestingly, the claimants did not seek to hold the South African
government, policemen, or other perpetrators of violence liable.8 Instead,
the claimants sued, among others, International Business Machines
Corporation (“IBM”) and Ford Motor Company—two U.S. corporations
conducting business in South Africa.9 The United States Second Circuit
Copyright 2016, by DUSTIN COOPER.
1. See Sharpeville Massacre, 21 March 1960, S. AFR. HIST. ONLINE,
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/sharpeville-massacre-21-march-1960
[https://perma.cc/5PBJ-5C3K] (last updated Jun. 21, 2016).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. In the late 1940s, the South African Government instituted a separation
of the races, beginning with classification and anti-miscegenation laws. These
actions proceeded to geographic segregation. Subsequently, the Bantu Authorities
Act of 1951 created “homelands.” Black South Africans were forcibly removed
to the homelands the Act created and were then stripped of their South African
citizenship. This system of separation is known as “apartheid.” See generally
South Africa Profile – Timeline, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa14094918 [https://perma.cc/4XQD-YNS9] (last updated Jun. 25, 2015).
6. See States of Emergency in South Africa: The 1960s and 1980s, S. AFR.
HIST. ONLINE, http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/state-emergency-south-africa1960-and-1980s [https://perma.cc/66RD-PDMT] (last updated Oct. 10, 2013).
7. See In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 243 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
8. See id.
9. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that IBM trained South African government
employees to use IBM hardware and software to create identity materials, such as
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Court of Appeals heard the plaintiffs’ plea for relief almost 15 years after
suit was originally filed.10 The court was tasked with determining whether
United States federal courts have jurisdiction over international matters
under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, commonly referred to as the Alien Tort Statute
(“ATS”).11
The ATS is a jurisdictional provision, providing in full, “The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”12 The First Congress in 1789 enacted this statute, not long
after the ratification of the Constitution, but the ATS has largely lain
dormant for almost two centuries.13 Beginning in the 1980s, however, the
Supreme Court breathed new life into the ATS,14 eventually waking the
proverbial sleeping giant. Courts have subsequently used this 33-word,
one-sentence statute to hold individuals and corporations liable for their
actions overseas that concern issues such as the apartheid in South
Africa,15 child slavery in the Ivory Coast,16 and the torture of individuals
in Iraq.17 The implications of the statute as applied to international
business activities were likely unimaginable to the members of the First
Congress who enacted the statute in the 18th century.
Courts and corporations need clear guidance for when such matters
can be adjudicated in the United States. U.S. corporations are increasingly
conducting business overseas,18 which could mean that U.S. corporate
activity affects more non-citizens and that the ATS will be increasingly
utilized as a form of redress for foreign nationals. This potential increase
those that were the subject of protest in Sharpeville. The allegations against Ford
were that it assisted the South African government in obtaining vehicles that were
used to aid in the persecution of the plaintiffs. See id.
10. See Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2015).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
12. Id.
13. 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3661.1 (4th ed. 2016).
14. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
15. See, e.g., Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013).
16. See, e.g., Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014).
17. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 527 (4th
Cir. 2014).
18. See U.S. Companies Using International Expansion to Drive Growth and
Profitability, BUS. WIRE (Aug. 13, 2013, 11:42 AM), http://www.businesswire.com
/news/home/20130813006035/en/U.S.-Companies-International-Expansion-Drive
-Growth-Profitability#.Vg1DpXpViko [https://perma.cc/AWN4-8M6P] (stating
that in a recent survey of 161 company executives, two-thirds expect international
markets to be among their company’s top priorities over the next three years).
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in ATS litigation magnifies the need for the courts to have a uniform and
identified approach for when the ATS can be used as a means for
jurisdiction. Not only do potential plaintiffs need to be informed about
whether and when they may seek the benefit of U.S. courts as a venue for
redress, but potential defendants also need to be informed about when they
might be forced to defend against liability actions in the United States.
Non-citizen plaintiffs might have several reasons for bringing a claim in
federal district court under the ATS as opposed to another tribunal.
Foreign claimants might view the federal courts as being more fair than
the courts in their home countries because of the independent judiciary and
favorable procedural rules found in the U.S.19 Furthermore, access to any
court in a particular claimant’s home country might be extremely
difficult.20 Additionally, ATS defendant corporations, without clear
guidelines as to when they might face liability for actions taken abroad,
are forced to conduct their business with uncertainty.
Unfortunately, neither the United States Congress nor the Supreme
Court has given definitive direction as to when a claim is justiciable under
the ATS, and more importantly, as to when a corporation can be sued in
the U.S. for actions committed in a foreign nation. In a recent landmark
case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court held that
the federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to hear claims against
corporations for actions occurring wholly outside the United States.21
Nevertheless, the Court issued a perplexing statement in dicta: “[E]ven
where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application.”22 Although indirectly stated, this language
suggests that actions that “touch and concern” the United States with
sufficient force are justiciable before the federal courts. However, the
19. See, e.g., Joseph T. McLaughlin & Justin H. Bell, New Limitations on the
Exercise of Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute, SN066 ALI-ABA 199, 201
(2008) (noting that in particular, the ATS has become a popular tool of foreign
litigants seeking access to the sympathetic juries and streamlined class-action
mechanisms of U.S. courts).
20. See Chris DeLaubenfels, Note, The Problem with the Duty to Adjudicate:
How Mediations Can Promote International Human Rights, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 541, 545–46 (2014) (citing U.S. INST. FOR PEACE & U.S. ARMY
PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY OPERATIONS INST., GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR
STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 7–86 (2009) (arguing that no access to
justice exists when citizens fear the system and the justice system is inaccessible
or incomprehensible)).
21. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
22. Id. at 1669.
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Court’s failure to provide guidelines for the touch and concern doctrine
has led to disparity among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The disparity among the circuits evidences the need for a solution that
will create uniformity in the application of the touch and concern doctrine.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief introduction to the history and
scope of the ATS. Part II examines the unresolved issue of corporate
liability under the ATS by exploring the holdings of seminal cases. Part
III proposes three factors that courts should utilize in determining whether
a claim sufficiently “touches and concerns” the United States: first, the
citizenship of the defendant; second, the location of the conduct; and third,
the nature of the alleged violation. Utilization of these factors will provide
corporations with greater certainty regarding their liability for business
conducted overseas and provide clarity to a statute that has been engulfed
by ambiguity since its inception.
I. HISTORY AND SCOPE OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Pursuant to the ATS, United States district courts have original
jurisdiction over any civil action brought by an alien, for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.23 Dissecting this short statute suggests that a complaint under the
ATS must allege three elements: first, that the plaintiff is an alien; second,
that the plaintiff is suing for a tort; and third, that the tort was committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.24 On its
face, therefore, the ATS could mistakenly be perceived as an
uncomplicated statute with a simple application.
A. Origins of the ATS
The ATS has a complex history and raison d’être and is continually
the subject of contrasting interpretation and implementation. Indeed, the
ATS has been described as a “legal Lohengrin”25 with an unclear origin,
even though it has existed since the First Congress enacted it in 1789.26
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
24. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Estate of Amergi
v. Palestinian Auth., 611 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2010).
25. Lohengrin is the hero of Richard Wagner’s opera of the same name.
Lohengrin is depicted as a knight of the Holy Grail and refuses to reveal, even to
his wife, the mystery of his origins. BRIAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF
MODERN LEGAL USAGE 532 (2d ed. 2001).
26. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated
on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
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Commentators have suggested that the statute is rooted in the following
federal powers: the grant of federal question jurisdiction under Article III
of the U.S. Constitution, the authority of the courts to interpret treaties,
and the national government’s power over international relations.27 The
“most basic original goal” of the statute was to enable federal courts to
hear cases affecting foreign relations to the exclusion of state courts.28
However, the intended practical effect of the statute, particularly with
respect to corporations, is a matter still open to interpretation.
Courts continue to wrestle with the determination of what causes of
action should be recognized under a claim involving the ATS.29 The ATS
is a purely jurisdictional statute that by itself does not create a statutory
cause of action for aliens. It was meant to have immediate practical effect
from the moment it became law, by providing the basis for district courts
to exercise jurisdiction over a modest number of causes of action
recognized under the law of nations, such as offenses against ambassadors,
violations of safe conduct, and possibly for piracy.30 Although these three
causes of action have largely been recognized as providing jurisdiction, no
definitive answer exists as to what type of claim would provide jurisdiction
under the present-day law of nations.31
B. Scope of the ATS
Understanding the jurisdictional reach of the ATS is imperative to
forming a determination as to corporate liability under the statute. To
furnish jurisdiction, the ATS provides that a potential alien claimant needs
to allege a tort committed in violation of the law of nations,32 also called
“customary international law,” or a treaty of the United States, generally
including war crimes and crimes against humanity.33 Although traditional
27. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3661.1.
28. John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1006 (S.D. Ind.
2007) (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714–19 (2004)).
29. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720, 724–25.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., id.
32. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (Revised): Tentative Draft No. 3, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 653, 655 (1982)
(noting that an international law is violated for the commission of genocide;
slavery or slave trade; the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals;
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged
arbitrary detention; systematic racial discrimination; or consistent patterns of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights).
33. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
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causes of action providing for jurisdiction appear somewhat settled,
determining what causes of action can provide jurisdiction under presentday international law requires an exploration of jurisprudence and the role
of custom in developing international law.
1. Jurisdictional Reach of the ATS According to Sosa v. AlvarezMachain
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court attempted not only to
clarify the jurisdictional reach of the ATS, but also to explain how the
statute applies to current issues that its drafters perhaps did not envision.34
The Court found that the ATS provides jurisdiction only when the
violation alleged is sufficiently definite and historically rooted in the
context of international law norms.35 Additionally, even when a colorable
claim for a violation of an international law norm is sufficiently set forth,
the cause of action must be among one of the modest number of
international law violations that carry the potential for personal liability
traditionally recognized under the ATS.36 Subsequent courts referred to
this analysis as a two-step test: first, the court must determine whether
there was a violation of a recognized crime against humanity committed
by the defendant; subsequently, if there was such a violation, the court
must determine whether the crime falls within the restricted group of
claims for which the ATS furnishes jurisdiction.37
To determine which violations Congress intended to furnish with
jurisdiction, the Court looked to the legislative intent of the drafters and to
Blackstone’s Commentaries.38 These sources disclosed three relevant
violations: offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and
piracy.39 However, the Court recognized that jurisdiction under the ATS
is not so rigid and limited as to preclude federal courts from recognizing
torts beyond the three that the First Congress contemplated because major
developments in international law have occurred since the ATS was
enacted.40 Nevertheless, expansion of the ATS through the recognition of
torts beyond the three offenses initially contemplated should be subject to
limitations.
34. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 315–16 (D.
Mass. 2013).
38. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719–20.
39. See id. at 720.
40. See id. at 724–25.
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2. Contemporary Crimes Recognized as Violating International
Norms
The Court in Sosa made clear that the expansion of the ATS is strictly
limited to those acts that violate a norm of international character that is
accepted by the “civilized world” and is defined specifically enough to
compare to one of the three international law violations that carried the
potential for personal liability when the statute was enacted.41 Under this
rule, courts have held that the following crimes constitute a violation of an
international norm, thereby providing jurisdiction under the ATS:
slavery,42 discrimination or persecution,43 and official torture.44
In addition to these violations, the scope of the original three violations
articulated in Sosa45—offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe
conduct, and piracy—has evolved and developed. For example, piracy
41. Offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy. See id.
42. See Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014). Three
former child slaves, who were forced to harvest cocoa in the Ivory Coast, brought
a class action against the multinational companies that controlled production of
Ivorian cocoa, alleging that the companies were liable under the ATS for aiding
and abetting child slavery in the Ivory Coast. The court, reversing the district
court’s decision, held that the prohibition against slavery was a universal norm of
international law that supported a claim under the ATS, and that the plaintiffs
sufficiently pleaded the required mens rea for aiding and abetting. The case was
remanded to allow the plaintiffs to amend their petition in light of the decision in
Kiobel, to prove that Nestlé USA’s conduct sufficiently “touched and concerned”
the United States.
43. See Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass.
2013). The court determined that persecution of sexual minorities was a crime
against humanity. The defendant allegedly aided and abetted this persecution from
the United States. For persecution to reach the level of a crime against humanity,
it typically must involve more than the “intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the
group or collectivity.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art.
7(2)(g), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S 38544. The persecution must also have been
proved to be “part of a widespread or systematic attack” to qualify as a crime
against humanity.
44. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884–87 (2d Cir. 1980). Citizens
of Paraguay brought action against another citizen of Paraguay for allegedly
causing the death of their son through torture. The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that deliberate torture
violates international law of human rights regardless of the nationalities of the
parties, thus providing jurisdiction under the ATS.
45. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720.
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might typically be associated with individuals with a peg leg or an eye
patch roaming the high seas while unlawfully boarding and pillaging
innocent vessels.46 However, the United States Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals recently held that a whale conservation group’s actions, which
included ramming, threatening, and throwing acid onto alleged whale
hunters’ ships, constituted piracy, even though the group believed it was
engaged in a noble purpose.47 As a result, jurisdiction under the ATS has
been expanded to include more than just the original three violations of
international law the First Congress envisioned, despite the Court’s
admonition in Sosa48 to strictly limit the expansion of jurisdiction under
the ATS.
3. The Role of Custom
Custom plays an important role in developing what constitutes an
international norm under Sosa’s two-step analysis. Customary practices
rise to the level of international law under certain circumstances.
Generally, a customary practice becomes a binding norm of international
law if it is a common and consistent practice that nations follow because
they feel a sense of legal obligation.49 Nations must adhere to the practice
because they believe international law requires it, not simply “because
they think it is a good idea, or politically useful, or otherwise desirable.”50
The notion that custom can occupy such a role in the law is not new. In The
Paquete Habana from 1900, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
“international law is part of our law and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice.”51 The administration of international
law, the Court explained, might involve considering the customs and usages
of other “civilized nations” and the work of commentators and jurists.52
Comprehending the type of activity for which a corporation might face
liability when doing business overseas is in the corporation’s best interest.
46. See Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc., 725
F.3d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 2013).
47. See id.
48. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25.
49. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3661.1 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 1987)); see also U.S. v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012)
(stating the process by which courts ought to derive customary international law
from state practice and opinio juris).
50. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d at 1252.
51. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
52. Id.

522

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

An understanding of the role of custom in shaping international law as well
as an acknowledgment of what crimes constitute a violation cognizable
under the ATS is fundamental in assessing liability under the statute. Such
an understanding enables defendants to better predict violations and conduct
their businesses with certainty. However, the level of activity necessary to
trigger the application of the statute is unclear at best.
II. CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Questions concerning liability for actions carried out overseas are not
unique to present-day corporations. As the ATS increasingly became the
focus of non-citizens’ claims53 following Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,54
questions arose as to whether and when a corporation can be haled into a
federal district court for torts the corporation allegedly committed
overseas. This case served as a catalyst for the discussion of corporate
liability under the ATS.
A. Tensions Between the Circuits Prior to the Second Circuit’s Decision
in Kiobel
After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,55 it was not uncommon for a corporation
to be haled into federal district court under the ATS. For example, in a
Ninth Circuit case, Burmese nationals brought an action under the ATS
against a U.S. oil company for allegedly aiding in the killing, torturing,
and illegal detention of individuals in furtherance of a project to lay
pipeline in Burma.56 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that
private individuals and corporations were subject to liability under the
ATS for actions committed in Colombia.57 In this case, Colombian
nationals sued a United States soft drinks licensor, Coca-Cola, and its

53. See, e.g., McLaughlin & Bell, supra note 19, at 204. In the decades
following Filartiga, the ATS gained popularity as a tool for pursuing high-profile
human and labor rights cases against individuals, governmental agents, and
corporations.
54. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
55. Id.
56. Nat'l Coal. Gov’t of Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 334
(C.D. Cal. 1997).
57. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated
by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012).
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Colombian subsidiary for collaborating with paramilitary forces to murder
and torture the nationals.58
Courts have justified corporate liability under the ATS by looking to
the historical placement of liability and jurisprudence, both domestic and
international. The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York recognized that historically, states—and to a lesser extent,
individuals—have been held liable for crimes under international law.59
The court in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. went
further, stating that considerable international and United States precedent
“indicates that corporations may also be held liable under international
law, at least for gross human rights violations.”60
Although the Second Circuit has not unequivocally held that
corporations are potentially liable for violations of the law of nations, it
has considered numerous cases61 in which plaintiffs sued corporations
under the ATS for alleged breaches of international law. In each of these
cases, the Second Circuit acknowledged that corporations are potentially
liable for violations of the law of nations that ordinarily entail individual
responsibility.62 This precedent from the Second Circuit indicates that
actions under the ATS against corporations for substantial violations of
international law can be viewed as “the norm rather than the exception.”63
Courts have further expanded this precedent, such that the general
consensus is that corporations should not be immune from tort liability
under the ATS.64
In addition to the apparent jurisprudential consensus that corporations
can face liability under the ATS, scholars have emphasized and even urged
expansion of the precedent to other areas of the law. One commentator
suggested that, under ATS precedent, human rights laws should also
extend to private corporations despite significant confusion and the lack
58. Id. at 1263 (alleging the corporation had collaborated with Colombian
paramilitary forces to murder and torture them).
59. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp.
2d 289, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
60. Id. at 319.
61. See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); Bigio v.
Coca–Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
62. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 313.
63. See id. at 319.
64. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Product Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that defendants presented no policy reason why
corporations should be uniquely exempt from tort liability under the ATS, and no
court has presented one either).
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of extensive early attention to private corporate liability for human rights
deprivations.65 Another commentator went so far as to urge expansion of
corporate liability under the ATS for certain corporations’ actions that
cause massive environmental degradation.66 As court decisions and
scholarly opinions evidence, before Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co.,67 subjecting corporations to liability under the ATS for violations of
international law perpetrated in a foreign nation was not uncommon.
However, this trend came to an abrupt halt in Kiobel.
B. The Second Circuit’s Clear Answer
Kiobel provided an opportunity for the Second Circuit to address
definitively the issue of corporate liability under the ATS. If the general
consensus had been that the ATS provided for jurisdiction over corporate
defendants, the Second Circuit deviated from that consensus in Kiobel.68
The case appeared not only to limit, but also to preclude the finding of
jurisdiction against a corporation under the ATS.
1. Facts and Procedural History
Nigerian nationals residing in the United States filed suit in federal
district court under the ATS, alleging that the defendants—certain Dutch,
British, and Nigerian corporations engaged in oil exploration—aided and
abetted the Nigerian government in committing violations of the law of
nations in Nigeria.69 Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed the corporations
aided and abetted extrajudicial killings; crimes against humanity; torture
or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest and detention;
violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association; forced
exile; and property destruction.70 The district court dismissed a number of
the plaintiffs’ claims, but denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss with
respect to aiding and abetting arbitrary arrest and detention; crimes against
humanity; and torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.71
65. Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations,
35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 802–03 (2002).
66. See Richard L. Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the Alien
Tort Claims Act: A Practical Assessment, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 621 (2000).
67. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 117.
70. Id. at 123.
71. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464–67
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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Additionally, the district court certified its order for interlocutory appeal
to the Second Circuit.72 This dismissal provided the Second Circuit with
the opportunity to address corporate liability under the ATS.
2. Corporate Liability
The Second Circuit found that corporate liability is not a rule of
customary international law because corporate liability is not recognized as
a “specific, universal, and obligatory norm.”73 In the court’s view,
“imposing liability on corporations for violations of customary international
law ha[d] not attained a discernable, much less universal, acceptance among
nations.”74 This view, however, was not shared unanimously.
In contrast with the majority’s opinion, Judge Leval’s concurrence
renounced a complete bar to corporate liability under the ATS, believing
the lack of liability deals a substantial blow to international law and its
undertaking to protect fundamental human rights.75 Judge Leval expressed
that despite any support in either the precedents or the scholarship of
international law, the majority still believed that corporations are not
subject to international law.76 To Judge Leval, such a position affords
violators of fundamental human rights the freedom to retain any profits so
earned without liability to their victims.77 Despite Judge Leval’s
concurrence, the majority’s limitation on corporate liability appeared to
provide a definitive answer under the ATS. No such clear answer existed,
however. Instead, confusion ensued after Kiobel because the Second
Circuit’s statements regarding corporate liability were merely dicta.
Further, opportunities to decide corporate liability under the ATS did not
present themselves to the other circuits.
3. Subsequent Decisions
After the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel, lower district courts
remained divided on the issue of corporate liability under the ATS. Some
decisions seemed to affirm the Kiobel majority’s reasoning and holding,
while others followed the principles that the concurring opinion

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 468.
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 136.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 149–50 (Leval, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
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articulated.78 In Kaplan v. Jazeera, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York expressly relied on Kiobel to hold that the
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claim
because the plaintiffs were seeking to hold the defendant corporation liable
for war crimes and violations of the law of nations under the ATS.79
Similarly, in In re Motors Liquidation Co., the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York held that United States courts
do not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate cases brought under
the ATS when the allegations are against a corporation.80 In re Motors
involved a contested matter in which the plaintiffs, who were residents of
South Africa, claimed to be victims of the apartheid system, which the
defendant corporations had allegedly aided and abetted.81 The court stated
that it was bound by the Second Circuit’s holding in Kiobel to find that
corporate liability had not attained a discernable acceptance among nations
and thus could not form the basis of jurisdiction under the ATS.82
In contrast, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois in Holocaust Victims of Bank Theft v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank agreed
with the concurring opinion in Kiobel.83 The court found “a sufficient legal
basis to hold corporations liable under the ATS for genocide.”84 The court
also found that “recognition of the humanitarian objectives of the law of
nations makes it unlikely that this body of law intend[ed] to exempt
corporations from its prohibitions or to provide a substantial financial
incentive85 to violate the most fundamental of human rights.”86 Various
other courts have also taken the position that the ATS does not preclude

78. Compare Kaplan v. Jazeera, No. 10 CIV. 5298, 2011 WL 2314783, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2011), with Holocaust Victims of Bank Theft v. Magyar
Nemzeti Bank, 807 F. Supp. 2d 689 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
79. Kaplan, 2011 WL 2314783, at *8.
80. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 447 B.R. 150, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
81. Id.
82. Id. See also Viera v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:09–CV–0495–RLY–DML,
2010 WL 3893791 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010) (holding that the ATS does not
provide federal court jurisdiction over claims based on a corporation’s voluntary
actions).
83. Holocaust Victims, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 689; see also Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F. 3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
84. Holocaust Victims, 807 F. Supp. 2d. at 694.
85. If a corporation would not face liability for actions it conducted wholly in
another country, that corporation might be financially incentivized, for example, to
carry out operations in a country with no child labor laws. Id. at 695 (citing Kiobel,
621 F. 3d at 159).
86. Id.
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corporate liability.87 The continued disparity among the courts, even after
the decision in Kiobel, made the issue of corporate liability ripe for the
Supreme Court’s review. The opportunity for certiorari appeared when the
petitioners in Kiobel appealed to the nation’s highest court for redress.88
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Kiobel
A definitive answer to the question of corporate liability under the
ATS seemed promising when the Supreme Court granted certiorari.89 The
Court ordered supplemental briefing on whether and under what
circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the ATS
against corporations for violations of the law of nations occurring within
the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.90 Ultimately,
Kiobel has added to the growing list of cases that have failed to definitively
address the issue of corporate liability.
1. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
The Court began its analysis by clarifying that the question at issue
was not whether the plaintiffs stated a proper claim under the ATS, but
whether a claim may reach conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign
sovereign.91 The defendants argued that claims under the ATS do not reach
conduct occurring in foreign countries, relying primarily on a canon of
statutory interpretation known as the “presumption against extraterritorial
application.”92 This canon provides that “‘when a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none,’ and reflects the
‘presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not
rule the world.’”93 This longstanding principle of U.S. law articulates that
Congressional legislation applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States unless a contrary intent appears.94
87. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011),
vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
88. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
89. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1664.
92. Id.
93. Id. (first quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,
2878 (2010); and then quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746,
1758 (2007)).
94. See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extrater
ritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 124 (1998).
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The presumption serves to protect against unintended conflict between
the laws of the United States and those of other nations, which could result
in international discord.95 The Supreme Court in Kiobel highlighted this
policy and stated that the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in
foreign policy is magnified in the context of the ATS because the courts,
rather than the lawmakers, shape important policy decisions.96 The Court
found that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the ATS
in general and to the plaintiffs’ case for redress in particular.97 This
presumption operated as a bar to the plaintiffs’ cause of action98 because
all of the alleged wrongs that the plaintiffs had suffered occurred outside
the United States.99
While the majority discussed the application of the presumption
against extraterritoriality, Justice Breyer’s concurrence, which Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined, offered a contrasting viewpoint.
The concurrence stated that the Court’s utilization of the presumption
against extraterritorial application offers limited help in addressing the
question before the Court.100 This question was under what circumstances
the ATS would allow a court to recognize a cause of action for violations
of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a country other than
the United States.101 The concurrence recognized that the presumption
against extraterritoriality does not preclude a finding of liability for foreign
actions.102 Rather, the question still remains open as to what circumstances
the ATS will furnish jurisdiction over claims that involve a defendant’s
actions in a foreign nation.
2. Corporate Liability
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s holding in Kiobel that the
plaintiffs could not sue the corporate defendants in U.S. court, the majority
went further and stated, “On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place
95. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991). See also Sexual
Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 322–23 (D. Mass. 2013)
(stating that the presumption against extraterritoriality is based in large part on
foreign policy concerns that tend to arise when domestic statutes are applied to
foreign nationals engaging in conduct in foreign countries).
96. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
97. Id. at 1665.
98. Id. at 1669.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 1672–73.
102. Id.
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outside the United States. And even where the claims touch and concern
the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”103 This
perplexing statement suggests that an unconditional bar to corporate
liability under the ATS does not exist. One commentator noted that the
dicta in the majority opinion can be read in one of two ways: either the
opinion limits the scope of the holding to cases involving no conduct
within the United States that contributes to human rights abuses overseas,
or it suggests that a case with different facts might be justiciable for foreign
conduct involving the abuse of human rights.104
The Supreme Court did not directly preclude corporations from
liability under the ATS as the Second Circuit had done;105 rather, the Court
limited the statute’s reach by finding that federal courts lack jurisdiction
to hear cases against corporations for actions occurring wholly outside the
United States. Thus, the presumption against extraterritorial application is
arguably rebuttable when claims touch and concern the territory of the
United States.106 The majority, however, offered no explanation as to the
meaning of “touch and concern” or as to the level of contact needed to
rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.
D. Confusion After the Supreme Court’s Decision in Kiobel
As Justice Kennedy recognized, the Court left “open a number of
significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation” of the ATS.107
The Court’s failure to answer definitively whether corporations may face
liability under the ATS has again led to disparity among U.S. circuit
courts.
In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., the Fourth Circuit
found that the plaintiffs could sue U.S. companies for the defendant’s
actions committed in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.108 In contrast, in
103. Id. at 1669 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citing Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883–88 (2010)).
104. Ross J. Corbett, Kiobel, Bauman, and the Presumption Against the
Extraterritorial Application of the Alien Tort Statute, 13 NW. U.J. INT'L HUM. RTS.
50, 9 (2015).
105. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106. For a discussion of the “touch and concern” doctrine see Alex S. Moe, A
Test by Any Other Name: The Influence of Justice Breyer’s Concurrence in Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 225, 286 (2014).
107. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
108. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014).
Four Iraqi citizens brought an action against a U.S. military contractor, alleging

530

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

Cardona v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit
found that the defendant could not be sued in federal court over allegations
that it supported Colombian paramilitary forces that tortured and killed
banana plantation workers, union members, and social activists in
Colombia.109 Similarly, in Balintulo v. Daimler AG, South Africans sued
a foreign corporation, Daimler AG, and two U.S. corporations, IBM and
Ford, for alleged complicity in apartheid.110 The Second Circuit dismissed
the touch and concern language in the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel
as mere dicta and dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit under the presumption
against extraterritoriality.111
As the circuit split regarding corporate liability evidences,112 whether
and at what point a corporation engages in conduct that touches and
concerns the United States, thereby conferring jurisdiction over the claim
to the federal district courts, is still unclear.
III. PROPOSED FACTORS COURTS SHOULD USE TO DETERMINE
THE MEANING OF “TOUCH AND CONCERN”
Because of the confusion among federal courts, both plaintiffs and
defendant corporations need guidance to determine what type of conduct
touches and concerns the United States and to rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality and confer jurisdiction under the ATS. The courts should
adopt the following factors to guide this primary determination: the
citizenship of the defendant; the location of the conduct; and the nature of
the alleged violation. Each factor constitutes an independently sufficient
basis for overcoming the presumption against extraterritoriality. If the
defendant is a citizen of the United States, if the alleged wrongful conduct
occurred in the United States, or if the alleged wrong is a violation of the
law of nations in which the United States has a distinct interest, the conduct
will touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to rebut the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
that the plaintiffs were abused and tortured during their detention at Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq as suspected enemy combatants.
109. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Does 1–144 v. Chiquita
Brands Int'l, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1853 (2015).
110. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
111. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190 (2d Cir. 2013) (denying
petition for writ of mandamus). The panel appeared to interpret the “touch and
concern” language as addressing only the situation in which some conduct occurs
abroad and some in the United States. See discussion infra Part III.B.
112. See, e.g., Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014).
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A. Citizenship of the Defendant
The status of a defendant as a United States citizen should lead to a
finding that the plaintiff’s claims touch and concern the United States with
sufficient force to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. Where
a defendant corporation is a U.S. citizen, foreign relations are less likely to be
affected, procedural complications are reduced, and a corporation’s activity
will more likely be found to touch and concern the United States. Federal
jurisprudence, international law, and scholarly commentary uniformly
support this consideration in determining jurisdiction under the ATS.
Numerous courts have agreed that the citizenship of a corporate defendant
is a relevant factor to consider and one that could distinguish a case from the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Kiobel. In Du Daobin v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the
defendant, Cisco, was a U.S. company with offices throughout the United
States, including Maryland, where the case was brought.113 This situation is
in contrast to the defendants in Kiobel, which were foreign corporations.114
The court assumed that the presumption against extraterritoriality did not bar
the case after the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel because the defendants
were domiciled in the United States.115
Furthermore, when the defendant is a United States citizen as opposed to
a foreign citizen, the potentially complicated issue of haling foreign citizens
into United States courts to adjudicate issues of liability diminishes. For
example, in Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, the court emphasized that
the defendant, Lively, was a U.S. citizen, unlike the British and Dutch
corporations in Kiobel.116 The court found that the Supreme Court’s
holding in Kiobel did not bar the ATS claims against a U.S. citizen in part
because a foreign national was not being haled into an unfamiliar court to
defend himself.117
Even in circuits that apply the presumption against extraterritoriality,
the dissenting opinions suggest that in future cases the courts might find
that corporate citizenship displaces the presumption.118 Judge Martin’s
113. Du Daobin v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 717 (D. Md. 2014).
114. Id. at 728.
115. Id.
116. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 321 (D. Mass. 2013).
117. Id. at 322–24. See also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d
516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding that the case does not present any potential
problems associated with bringing foreign nationals into United States courts to
answer for conduct committed abroad, given that the defendants are United States
citizens).
118. See, e.g., Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1192–93
(11th Cir. 2014) (Martin, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015), cert.
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dissent in Cardona explains that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel
offers little guidance as to what kinds of domestic connections overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality.119 Judge Martin saw the Cardona case
as overcoming the presumption of extraterritoriality because, among other
reasons, the primary defendant, Chiquita, was a corporation headquartered
and incorporated within the United States.120 Judge Martin concluded that the
plaintiff’s claims touched and concerned the territory of the United States
because the plaintiff alleged a U.S. citizen’s violation of international law.121
Equally, the court in Balintulo v. Daimler AG did not address whether the
defendant’s U.S. citizenship was enough to rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality,122 but the court's language indicated that corporate presence
in the United States weighs in favor of displacing the presumption.123
International law also supports the consideration of the defendant’s
citizenship under the ATS analysis. Under the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law, every nation has the authority to regulate the conduct of its
own citizens, regardless of whether the conduct of those citizens occurs
inside or outside that nation’s borders.124 Furthermore, other developed
nations such as Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Holland take the
approach that extraterritorial torts should be disallowed except for claims
asserted against their own nationals.125 Even the foreign governments that
urged the Supreme Court in Kiobel to dismiss the claims against the
foreign corporations acknowledged in amicus briefs that a claim under the

denied sub nom. Does 1–144 v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1853 (2015);
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190 (2d Cir. 2013).
119. Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1192–93 (Martin, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See generally Balintulo, 727 F.3d 174.
123. Recent Case, Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013), 127
HARV. L. REV. 1493, 1498 (2014) (stating, “the Court’s language signifies that
corporate presence is an issue of weight rather than relevance for the purposes of
the ‘touch and concern’ test, thereby leaving the door open for corporate
nationality to displace the presumption”).
124. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 402(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“[A] state has jurisdiction to
prescribe law with respect to . . . the activities, interests, status, or relations of its
nationals outside as well as within its territory . . . .”).
125. See Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1192–93 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing Brief
for Gov't of the Kingdom of the Netherlands et al. at 18–23, 21 n.32, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2010) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL
2312825).
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ATS would have a “sufficiently close connection” with the United States
if the defendants were United States citizens.126
Last, legal commentators have also noted that citizenship might be an
important factor in determining corporate liability under the ATS. In an
appraisal issued just one day after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kiobel,
one commentator, Oona Hathaway,127 observed that the decision allowed
for “foreign squared” cases to be heard in U.S. courts.128 “Foreign
squared” cases are those in which the alleged harm occurred on U.S. soil
or either the plaintiff or defendant is a U.S. citizen.129 Hathaway concluded
that “the end result of the Supreme Court’s decision . . . may not be the
end of the ATS after all, but instead a renewed focus of ATS litigation on
U.S. corporations.”130 The status of an alleged violator of international law
as a U.S. corporation will likely be the focus in a plaintiff’s argument that
a specific case touches and concerns the United States.131 United States
corporations are far more likely to satisfy the touch and concern
requirement with sufficient force to rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality because their headquarters and key personnel are more
likely to be located in the United States.132
Although the Supreme Court in Kiobel noted that corporations often
have a presence in many countries, and corporate presence alone does not
serve to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality,133 Kiobel
involved foreign, rather than United States, citizens. American corporations
have more than a mere corporate presence in the United States by virtue of
their incorporation in the United States and because they receive the benefits
and protection of U.S. laws. The distinction between mere corporate
presence and incorporation was the exact argument the plaintiffs set forth

126. See id. at 1193.
127. Founder and Director of the Center for Global Legal Challenges at Yale
Law School. See Oona A. Hathaway, YALE L. SCH., https://www.law.yale.edu/oona
-hathaway [https://perma.cc/Z97L-CZ84] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
128. Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to “Foreign
Squared” Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog
.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases/
[perma.cc/X35B-C8QM].
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Anupam Chander, Unshackling Foreign Corporations: Kiobel’s Unexpected
Legacy, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 829, 830 (2013).
132. Id.
133. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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in Cardona.134 The dissenting Judge Martin agreed, noting that the
defendants had more than a mere corporate presence because they were
incorporated in the United States, providing a crucial difference between
their case and Kiobel.135
While some courts have stated that U.S. citizenship is irrelevant to the
jurisdictional analysis under the ATS, such an argument is not persuasive.
For example, in Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., the Second Circuit disagreed
with the contention that a defendant’s U.S. citizenship is relevant to the
jurisdictional analysis, believing instead that the full “focus” of the ATS
analysis is on the defendant’s conduct.136 As the Eleventh Circuit has
recognized, however, the Supreme Court has not completely excluded the
significance of U.S. citizenship. Particularly, the Eleventh Circuit
specified that Kiobel did not concern U.S. citizens, and therefore the
opinion did not reach the merits of the touch and concern analysis.137
Additionally, the court keenly observed that Kiobel, which did address
corporate presence within the U.S., indirectly supports the proposition that
citizenship or corporate status might in fact be relevant to whether a claim
touches and concerns the territory of the United States.138 The Eleventh
Circuit noted that after analyzing the facts of the case, the Court in Kiobel
simply determined that “mere corporate presence” was inadequate.139
The principles articulated under federal jurisprudence, international
law, and legal commentary make clear that a corporate defendant’s United
States citizenship is, at a minimum, relevant to the jurisdictional analysis
under the ATS. Furthermore, a corporate defendant’s status as a United
States citizen is sufficient to overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Although the citizenship of the defendant can be a
dispositive factor, it is not the only factor that will rebut the presumption.
B. Location of the Conduct
If part or all of a corporation’s allegedly tortious conduct occurred
within the United States rather than wholly in a foreign nation, the
corporation’s actions might touch and concern the United States with
sufficient force to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.
134. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1192–93 (11th Cir.
2014) (Martin, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015), cert. denied
sub nom. Does 1–144 v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1853 (2015).
135. Id. at 1192–93.
136. See Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 189 (2d Cir. 2014).
137. Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 594 (11th Cir. 2015).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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Similar to the citizenship factor, this factor finds sufficient support under
federal jurisprudence. Moreover, significant foreign policy concerns buttress
the need of the courts to consider conduct occurring within the United States
when deciding whether jurisdiction under the ATS is present.
1. Specific Personal Jurisdiction
An analogy to specific personal jurisdiction lends support to the
proposition that conduct that occurs within the United States should
provide jurisdiction under the ATS. 140 In interpreting the Due Process
Clause, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a distinction
between two types of personal jurisdiction: “general” and “specific.”141 A
state exercises “specific” personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the
cause of action arises out of the defendant’s contact with the state.142 Although
the Supreme Court has addressed relatively few cases regarding the ATS, the
Court has frequently addressed the issue of specific personal jurisdiction.
One example of specific personal jurisdiction is International Shoe Co. v.
State of Washington, which involved a corporation that sent salespersons into
the state of Washington to solicit sales of shoes.143 The company had no other
contacts with the state.144 The Supreme Court held that the salespersons’
contacts with Washington were sufficient for the state to exercise jurisdiction
over the corporation, as well as to collect taxes from it.145 The Court noted
that to the extent a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state, the corporation enjoys the benefits and protection
of the laws of that state.146 Therefore, the exercise of that privilege may
give rise to certain obligations,147 which require the corporation to respond
140. For a further analysis of specific personal jurisdiction see 36 C.J.S.
Federal Courts § 34 (2012).
141. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.15 (1985);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1984).
142. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudi
cate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144 (1966).
143. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement,
66 S. Ct. 154, 157 (1945). The salespersons resided in Washington, their principal
activities were confined to that state, and their compensation was based on the
amount of their sales in that state. The corporation provided its salespersons with a
line of samples, which they displayed to prospective purchasers. On occasion the
salespersons rented rooms for exhibiting samples in business buildings. The
company reimbursed the cost of such rentals.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 160–61.
146. Id. at 160.
147. Id.
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to a suit brought in that jurisdiction.148 Enforcing such obligations cannot
be said to be excessive.149
A court’s exercise of specific jurisdiction over a defendant corporation
can be analogized to a corporation being haled into federal district court in
the United States under the ATS for allegedly wrongful conduct committed
in the United States in violation of the law of nations or United States
treaties. The forum state in a specific jurisdiction analysis is similar to the
United States in an ATS jurisdictional analysis. As the defendant in
International Shoe was found to be subject to jurisdiction in Washington,150
a corporation that voluntarily and intentionally acts in the United States in
furtherance of a violation of the law of nations abroad should be subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States. When a corporation engages in conduct
in the United States, jurisdiction is proper even though the harm is felt
abroad. A finding of jurisdiction rests on the principle that subjecting a
corporation that carries out conduct in the United States to the jurisdiction
of a federal district court is not unreasonable.151 Further, jurisprudential
support exists for finding jurisdiction over a corporate defendant under the
ATS when that defendant has engaged in tortious acts in the United States,
even if the harm was felt in a foreign nation.
2. Sufficient Conduct Under the ATS
In Kiobel, the Supreme Court framed its analysis as focusing solely on
the location of the relevant “conduct” or “violation.”152 In Balintulo v.
Daimler AG, the Second Circuit clarified that the phrase “relevant conduct,”
as used in Kiobel for the touch and concern analysis, referred to the conduct
constituting the alleged offenses under the law of nations.153 Thus, in
conducting its extraterritoriality analysis, the court in Balintulo looked
solely to the site of the alleged violations of customary international law.154
If the site of these violations was the United States, the court agreed that the
conduct should be sufficient to touch and concern the United States, thus

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 161.
151. This finding of jurisdiction also provides support for the above factor,
“Citizenship of the Defendant.” See supra Part III.A.
152. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665–69 (2013)).
153. Id. at 189–90.
154. Id.
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overcoming the presumption against extraterritoriality.155 Numerous courts
have applied this reasoning.
In Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, the court distinguished its case
from Kiobel because the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendant’s
tortious acts took place to a substantial degree within the United States.156
The court reasoned that the plaintiff should not be denied a claim under
the ATS, even though the impact of the defendant’s conduct was felt in
Uganda.157 The plaintiff claimed the defendant planned and managed a
campaign of repression in Uganda from the United States.158 The court
analogized this conduct to a terrorist who designs and manufactures a
bomb in the United States, which he then mails to Uganda with the intent
for it to explode there.159 That the harmful effects of wrongful conduct are
felt in a foreign nation is simply insufficient to preclude a finding that the
presumption against extraterritoriality is rebutted when conduct relevant
to the tort occurs in the United States. Further, the court stated that the
Supreme Court’s holding in Kiobel is limited in scope—the presumption
against the extraterritorial application bars suit under the ATS only when
a defendant's conduct lacks sufficient connection to the United States.160
In Krishanti v. Rajaratnam,161 the defendants attempted to focus on all
of the harm to the plaintiffs occurring in Sri Lanka to deny the United
States court jurisdiction under the ATS. The court, however, found that
the defendants’ argument would stand only if the plaintiffs were suing the
defendants for their actions in Sri Lanka.162 The defendants’ actions were
in fact committed in the United States.163 The actions included the hosting
of meetings and fundraisers in the United States to raise funds to commit
155. Id.
156. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 321 (D. Mass.
2013). See also Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1194 (11th
Cir. 2014) (Martin, J., dissenting) (“[P]laintiffs here do not seek to hold Chiquita
liable for any of its conduct on foreign soil. Critically, the plaintiffs instead have
alleged that Chiquita’s corporate officers reviewed, approved, and concealed
payments and weapons transfers to Colombian terrorist organizations from their
offices in the United States.”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015), cert. denied
sub nom. Does 1–144 v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1853 (2015).
157. See Sexual Minorities, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 321–22.
158. Id. at 309–10.
159. Id. at 321–22.
160. See id. at 321–22. See also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct.
2869, 2884 (2010); Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005).
161. Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, No. 2:09-CV-05395(JLL)(JAD), 2014 WL
1669873 at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014).
162. Id. at *10.
163. Id.
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human rights violations in Sri Lanka, creating United States corporations to
contribute money to organizations supporting the violations in Sri Lanka, and
bribing United States officials to remove a terrorist organization from the
Foreign Terrorist Organization list.164 Because the defendants’ actions
occurred in the United States, the court found jurisdiction was proper under
the ATS.165 The Eleventh and Second Circuits also agree that the location of
the conduct is significant to the analysis.166
Foreign policy concerns also support holding corporate defendants
liable when the corporation’s wrongful conduct occurs on U.S. soil. The
“most basic original goal”167 of the ATS is to allow federal courts to hear
cases affecting foreign relations and to keep these matters outside the state
courts’ purview.168 If the United States were to make its courts unavailable
164. Id.
165. Id. at *10–11.
166. See Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 592 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating
that in weighing the pertinent facts, the site of the conduct alleged is relevant and
carries significant weight); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 191 (2d Cir.
2014) (finding that domestic conduct “touched and concerned” the United States
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality and to
establish jurisdiction under the ATS). The defendants carried out multiple actions
in the United States, including domestic purchases and financing transactions and
numerous New York-based payments and “financing arrangements” through a
New York bank account. Id. See also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc.,
758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding that presumption was displaced in
part because CACI’s managers in the United States gave tacit approval to the acts
of torture, attempted to cover up the misconduct, and encouraged it); Mwani v.
Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that a terrorist attack that was
plotted in part within the United States and directed at a United States Embassy
and its employees displaced the presumption); Du Daobin v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2 F.
Supp. 3d 717, 728 (D.Md. 2014) (observing that Kiobel might be distinguishable
because “Cisco is an American company” and because plaintiffs alleged that
Cisco’s actions “took place predominantly, if not entirely, within the United
States”).
167. John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1006 (S.D. Ind.
2007) (citing Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715–19 (2004)).
168. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3661.1. The Continental Congress faced
this problem several years before the ratification of the Constitution during the
Marbois incident, which involved an alleged incident of assault and battery
against a French diplomat in Philadelphia. The French government complained
about the treatment of the French minister by the state courts, but the state
judiciary was unapologetic. Congress instructed the national Secretary of Foreign
Affairs to apologize to the French and to explain “the nature of a federal union”
and that the “young Nation” needed “many allowances.” By enacting the ATS
shortly after the ratification of the new Constitution, the First Congress acted to
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for claims against persons acting in the U.S. who cause injury to people or
groups overseas, the U.S. would “itself create the potential for just the sort
of foreign policy complications that the limitations on federal common law
claims recognized under the ATS are aimed at avoiding.”169 Indeed, under
the law of nations, nations have a responsibility to make courts accessible
for claims that foreign claimants bring against individuals who are citizens
of that nation or who are within the nation’s borders.170
The location of the wrongful conduct is significant in formulating a
decision about whether the conduct touches and concerns the United States
with sufficient force to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.
If the alleged conduct occurred within the United States, the presumption
will likely be overcome, notwithstanding that the effects of the conduct
materialize in a foreign country. Additionally, even when the location of the
conduct is unclear, or the conduct does not occur in the United States,
jurisdiction might be found under the substantive law governing a particular
alleged violation.
C. The Nature of the Alleged Violation
To establish subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS, a plaintiff’s
allegation of a violation of the law of nations in which the United States
has a distinct interest should be sufficient. This last factor finds support
under the concept of universal jurisdiction, which is the legislative intent
underlying the creation of the ATS and which is conformable to the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Kiobel.
All civilized nations have a duty to eliminate violations of the law of
nations, which are interpreted in reference to international customary

ensure that the federal government could address such sensitive cases in its own
courts. See Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Respublica v. De
Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111 (1784); see also William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’
Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations,
18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 515–22 (1986) (detailing the Framers’ concern to establish
federal jurisdiction over cases with potential implications for foreign affairs).
169. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 322–23 (D.
Mass. 2013).
170. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J. concurring) (stating that if the court’s decision constitutes a
denial of justice, or if it appears to condone the original wrongful act, under the
law of nations the United States would become responsible for the failure of its
courts and be answerable not to the injured alien but to the alien’s home state),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
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law.171 Despite being relatively limited in scope,172 the doctrine of
universal jurisdiction allows a nation to prosecute offenses to which it has
no connection at all. Jurisdiction is based solely on the heinous nature of the
alleged conduct.173 According to the doctrine, any nation can prosecute
universal offenses, even over the objection of the defendants’ and victims’
home states.174 Allowing the adjudication of claims involving violations of
the law of nations in United States courts under the ATS does not run
contrary to established principles of international law.
Further, the legislative intent underlying the creation and interpretation
of the ATS supports holding foreign defendants liable in the United States
when a heinous violation of the law of nations in which the United States
has a particular interest has occurred. The Supreme Court in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain noted that the “First Congress understood that the district courts
would recognize private causes of action for certain torts in violation of the
law of nations.”175 Historically, pirates were thought to be subject to
jurisdiction in the courts of any nation because they did not operate within
any jurisdiction.176 Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence in Kiobel that
like pirates, torturers and perpetrators of genocide are subject to
jurisdiction wherever they are found.177 They are “common enemies of all
mankind and all nations have an equal interest in their apprehension and
punishment.”178 If the Court’s interpretation of the ATS furnishes
jurisdiction for all claims that violate the law of nations, a fortiori courts

171. See 2 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 9:23 (2016). For a list of violations deemed cognizable
under the ATS see supra Part I.B.1.
172. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 402(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). A state has jurisdiction to define
and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of
nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking
of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even
where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is present. Id.
173. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal
Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 183 (2004).
174. See id.
175. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
176. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1667 (2013).
177. See id. at 1670–76 (Breyer, J., concurring).
178. Id. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 404 n.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting In re Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 556 (N.D.Ohio 1985)).
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should have jurisdiction under the ATS to hear violations of the law of
nations in which the United States has a specific interest.179
Moreover, the United States Congress is undoubtedly aware of cases in
which courts have awarded civil damages under the ATS for violations of
the law of nations, and Congress has not sought to limit the jurisdictional or
substantive reach of the ATS.180 For example, in 1980 the Second Circuit
decided Filartiga,181 which involved a group of citizens from Paraguay
who alleged that the defendant, also a citizen of Paraguay, wrongfully
caused the death of a family member. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant tortured and killed the family member in retaliation for the family
member’s father’s political actions and beliefs.182 The court held that the
ATS furnished jurisdiction and awarded the plaintiffs approximately $10
million in damages.183 Indeed, Congress has enacted other statutes, both
civil and criminal in nature, that allow the U.S. to prosecute or allow victims
to obtain damages from foreign persons who injure foreign victims by

179. The Eleventh Circuit believes jurisdiction for violations of the law of
nations should be limited. In Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. the court
stated that it would potentially deny ATS claims alleging torture, employing in
part a narrow reading of Sosa. 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 1842 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Does 1-144 v. Chiquita Brands Int’l,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1853 (2015). This language suggests the Eleventh Circuit would
limit actionable claims under the ATS to those primary offenses that existed when
the ATS was enacted. Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit’s comments are dicta; the
court ultimately dismissed the action because the relevant conduct occurred
outside the United States and did not “touch and concern the United States.” Id.
at 1189. Judge Martin’s dissent parallels other cases that furnish jurisdiction under
the ATS for a violation of the law of nations. Specifically, he argues that U.S.
corporate sponsorship of torture should be potentially actionable, despite the
torture’s occurrence outside the United States. Id. at 1192–93.
180. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1677 (Breyer, J. concurring). If Congress did
wish to limit the jurisdictional or substantive reach, Congress could do so. For
example, in 2013, Congress passed a revised Stolen Valor Act after the Supreme
Court invalidated the earlier version in June 2012. In United States v. Alvarez, the
Court held that the prohibition on making false claims about receiving military
honors violated the First Amendment’s protection for freedom of speech. 132 S.
Ct. 2537 (2012). Subsequently, Congress revised the Act so that only making false
claims about military honors for financial gain or some other profit is a crime.
181. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that deliberate
torture violates international law of human rights regardless of the nationalities of
the parties, thus providing jurisdiction under the ATS).
182. See id. at 878.
183. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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committing heinous acts such as torture or genocide while abroad.184 A
number of these statutes were enacted after Filartiga.185 Because Congress
has not attempted to limit the jurisdictional scope of the ATS, defendant
corporations that allegedly violate the law of nations should be subject to
jurisdiction under the ATS when the United States has a specific interest
in adjudication of the claim.
Last, granting United States courts jurisdiction over claims in which
the country has a distinct interest conforms to the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Kiobel. To furnish jurisdiction under the ATS before the decision in
Kiobel, a claim’s allegation that a violation of the law of nations had
occurred might have been sufficient.186 The Court added another layer to
the jurisdictional analysis, however, through its touch and concern
language in Kiobel. This new layer is evidenced by the fact that the crimes
alleged in Kiobel were violations of the law of nations, but the Court
declined to furnish jurisdiction under the ATS.187 The factor proposed is
in line with the Court’s decision in Kiobel because a claim touches and
concerns the United States when the claim involves a violation of the law
of nations in which the United States has a specific interest in prosecuting.
Certain violations of the law of nations specifically concern the United
States and should be heard in the United States federal courts. The
historical example of such a violation is piracy.188 This crime persists
today and affects both the United States economy and its citizens.
Transportation of goods by water contributed $36 billion and 64,000 jobs
to the U.S. economy in 2010.189 By value, shipping vessels carry 53% and
184. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b)(2) (2012) (authorizing prosecution of
torturers if “the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the
nationality of the victim or alleged offender”); § 1091(e)(2)(D) (genocide prosecution
authorized when “regardless of where the offense is committed, the alleged offender
is . . . present in the United States”); Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, §2(a),
Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (creating a private right of action on behalf of
individuals harmed by an act of torture or extrajudicial killing committed “under
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation”); Kiobel, 133 S.
Ct. at 1677.
185. See supra note 184.
186. John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1006 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
187. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
188. See Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What
Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 111, 132 (2004).
189. See MATTHEW CHAMBERS & MINDY LIU, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
MARITIME TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION BY THE NUMBERS (2011), http://www
.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/by_the_numbers/maritime_
trade_and_transportation/index.html [https://perma.cc/X2EG-6PAF].
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38% of U.S. imports and exports, respectively—the largest share of any
mode of transportation.190 Although a popular mode of transportation, this
industry is increasingly facing the threat of piracy.191 Not only does piracy
endanger the lives and cargo on board both U.S. ships and foreign vessels
travelling to the U.S.,192 but it also has economic implications.193 Because
of the prominence of the maritime shipping industry within the United
States, the federal courts have a special interest in adjudicating piracy
cases.
If a defendant corporation is alleged to have violated the law of nations
and the United States has a distinct interest in the adjudication of the
violation, the corporation should be subject to the jurisdiction of United
States courts under the ATS. As one court keenly observed, if corporations
are capable of being found liable for war crimes, as indeed they are, then
logically, corporations should be capable of being found liable for other
international crimes.194 This factor, along with the citizenship of the
defendant and the location of the conduct, will provide certainty in an area
of the law engulfed in ambiguity.
CONCLUSION
The courts, as well as plaintiffs and defendant corporations, would
benefit tremendously from direction as to when conduct will “touch and
concern” the United States with sufficient force to rebut the presumption
against extraterritoriality. No clear consensus exists as to whether or when
190. Id.
191. For example, the number of piracy incidents worldwide increased 68%
from 2000 to 2006, compared to the previous six-year period. See Increase in Piracy
and Terrorism At Sea; Little Evidence Supports Fear That the Two Crimes Are
Merging, RAND CORP. (June 5, 2008), http://www.rand.org/news/press/2008/06
/05.html [https://perma.cc/P6MD-3ZBP].
192. See, e.g., Pirates Kidnap Two Americans in Ship Attack off Coast of Nigeria,
FOX NEWS (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/10/24/americanskidnapped-by-pirates-off-coast-nigeria-official-says/[https://perma.cc/5EET-CQ8R];
Mark Mazzetti and Sharon Otterman, U.S. Captain Is Hostage of Pirates; Navy Ship
Arrives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/09/world/af
rica /09pirates.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/WM77-Y942].
193. According to international shipping organizations, insurance rates for ships
rose from an estimated $500 per voyage in 2008 to $20,000 per voyage in 2009—a
40-fold increase—because of piracy. See Raymond Gilpin, Counting the Costs of
Somali Piracy (June 22, 2009) (working paper) (on file with the Louisiana Law
Review), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc
/57MG-UZ4X].
194. William v. AES Corp., 28 F. Supp. 3d 553, 566 (E.D. Va. 2014).
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a non-citizen under the ATS may hale into court a corporation for a harm
the corporation causes overseas. Having a set of factors available for
courts to utilize in determining jurisdiction will provide greater uniformity
between the circuits, as well as certainty for litigants. Courts should
consider the citizenship of the defendant, the location of the conduct, and
the nature of the claimed violation when determining whether a claim
sufficiently “touches and concerns” the United States for purposes of ATS
jurisdiction. If the specific claim is relevant to one of these factors, the
claim should be justiciable under the ATS because it rebuts the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Utilization of these factors would
allow corporations to conduct their businesses with greater certainty, while
allowing plaintiffs to save time and resources on claims under which the
ATS would ultimately not provide jurisdiction.
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